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Justifying a (Welsh) Legal Jurisdiction 
 
When should a community have its own legal system? Interest in the question is spurred by a 
topical debate. Early in 2017, the Wales Act received Royal assent following a stormy and 
protracted legislative passage.1 The Act substantially alters the Welsh devolution settlement. 
Most notably, it shifts Welsh devolution from a conferred powers to a reserved powers model. 
The Welsh Assembly is no longer told what it may do, but what it may not do. This permits 
comparisons between the Assembly and devolved legislatures in Edinburgh and Stormont; 
there is consistency in the form of devolution, if not yet in scope.2 Yet even before the new 
settlement came fully into force, there have been complaints that important questions are 
unresolved. Prominent amongst these questions is whether there should be a Welsh legal 
jurisdiction, separate from England. In September 2017 the Welsh government appointed the 
outgoing Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, 3 to lead a Commission whose terms 
of reference include the possibility of establishing a Welsh legal jurisdiction.4 Whether or not 
Wales should become a separate legal system intimately connects with principled questions 
about what makes a legal system legitimate. In the devolution context, principle is too 
frequently dashed on the rocks of political pragmatism.5 My argument seeks to avoid that fate.  
 I shall argue that creating separate bodies of law, separate courts, and a separate 
judiciary can be justified in light of a proper understanding of the judicial function. Judging 
sometimes involves exercising discretion in line with community values. It follows that a 
community with distinctive values ought to have a distinct court system. Although this 
principled argument applies generally, I shall focus for practical purposes on the debate about 
Wales. In Section 1, I define legal jurisdiction and outline the parameters of the current debate. 
In Section 2, I outline the background to the Welsh jurisdiction debate, arguing that formerly 
                                                 
1 For a detailed account, see: Richard Rawlings, ‘The Strange Reconstitution of Wales’ [2018] Public Law 62-
83 
2 Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 303 
3 Welsh Government, ‘First Minister establishes a Commission on Justice in Wales’ (Welsh Government, 18 
September 2017) <http://gov.wales/newsroom/firstminister/2017/170918-first-minister-establishes-commission-
on-justice-in-wales/?lang=en> accessed 26 July 2018  
4 The Commission on Justice in Wales, ‘Terms of Reference’ (Welsh Government, 22 February 2018) 
<https://beta.gov.wales/commission-justice-wales/terms-reference> accessed 26 July 2018 
5 See, for example: Commission on Devolution in Wales, Empowerment and Responsibility: Legislative Powers 
to Strengthen Wales (2014) (Silk Commission) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140605075122/http://commissionondevolutioninwales.independe
nt.gov.uk/> accessed 31 July 2018; House of Lords Constitution Committee, The Union and Devolution (HL 
Paper 149 2015-160); Rawlings, ‘The Strange Reconstitution of Wales’ (n x) 




strong arguments against reform are no longer persuasive. In Section 3, I suggest that 
arguments premised on political devolution are limited in terms of persuasiveness and 
ramifications. In Section 4, I propose a novel justification for extensive jurisdictional reform. 
A proper understanding of the judicial function entails that judicial decision-making must be 
responsive to local community values. If Welsh community values diverges sufficiently from 
English community values, radical jurisdictional reform is justified. 
1 What is a Legal Jurisdiction? 
1.1 A Narrow Concept 
For Asha Kaushal, ‘[j]urisdiction is a multivalent concept.’6 Jurisdiction undoubtedly means 
‘different things in different circumstances.’7 Our circumstances are the debate over Welsh 
legal jurisdiction, in which context meaning of jurisdiction has been considered. For Tim Jones 
and Jane Williams, a jurisdiction has ‘three commonly accepted characteristics [...] a defined 
territory; a distinct body of law; and a structure of courts and legal institutions.’8 This 
conception of jurisdiction has been criticised as over-broad by Richard Percival. For him, this 
‘orthodox analysis of “jurisdiction-hood” is flawed in ways that have unhelpfully limited the 
policy debate’.9 A focus on territory, for example, struggles to account for the extra-territorial 
yet intra-jurisdictional application of some law, such as the English & Welsh law against 
murder.10 Percival also doubts that unique legal institutions are a necessary condition of 
jurisdictionhood. Some courts, like the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, decide cases 
for several jurisdictions.11 Their shared court does not entail that those jurisdictions are in fact 
united.  
For Percival, jurisdiction has a narrower meaning. A jurisdiction comprises ‘three sets 
of legal rules: rules creating a court; rules providing a court with a judiciary; and finally rules 
setting out the reach of the court.’12 ‘Reach rules’ delineate a body of law that a court has 
authority to apply. In my view, reach rules are the essence of jurisdiction. Every jurisdiction is 
                                                 
6 Asha Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 759-92, 791 
7 Ibid 760 
8 Jones and Williams, ‘Wales as a Jurisdiction’ (n x) 78 
9 Richard Percival, ‘How to Do Things with Jurisdictions: Wales and the Jurisdiction Question’ [2017] Public 
Law 249-69, 249  
10 Ibid 252-53  
11 Ibid 251 
12 Ibid 250-51  




a defined body of law. That body of law is defined by reach rules. When we are using 
‘jurisdiction’ synonymously with ‘legal system’, reach rules may appear to have something in 
common with H.L.A. Hart’s rules of recognition.13 These are standards specifying what is and 
is not a valid rule of a legal system. But jurisdictional reach rules are a broader category than 
rules of recognition, since they do not necessarily specify all valid legal rules of a system. The 
jurisdiction of the Criminal Division of the UK Court of Appeal, for example, is constrained to 
cases concerning a subset of valid laws of the system.14 It does not have jurisdiction to 
determine family law disputes, even though family law is equally part of the system.  
Critically, Percival defines jurisdiction such that its distinct reach rules need not 
correspond to a distinct court system or judiciary.15 One court can adjudicate for multiple 
bodies of law without imperilling the existence of those bodies of law as distinctive 
jurisdictions. This conceptual point deserves attention because it indicates the minimum 
existence conditions for a jurisdiction.16 Minimally, transforming the unified England & Wales 
jurisdiction into two jurisdictions requires the replacement of one set of reach rules with two. 
Wales could be established as a jurisdiction without establishing separate Welsh courts or 
judiciary.  
1.2 A Broad Debate 
While the conceptual definition clarifies the separability of several categories of institutional 
reform, we should not limit discussion by reference to the concept. Debates over Welsh 
jurisdiction are not just discussions of whether Wales should be a jurisdiction, whatever the 
concept happens to mean. To be sure, once Welsh reach rules are established a Welsh legal 
jurisdiction will exist. But this technical exercise is the least radical of various proposed 
reforms. The debate extends to matters beyond conceptual necessity, including separate Welsh 
courts, judiciary, legal professions, and political control over the wider justice system.  
Since the Welsh jurisdiction debate encompasses a wide range of possible reforms, it 
is regrettable that options for reform have been widely characterised in binary terms. 
Commentators frequently present a choice between two models: a ‘distinct’ or a ‘separate’ 
jurisdiction.17 Establishing a distinct Welsh jurisdiction is the more conservative option. At 
                                                 
13 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 100-10 
14 Criminal Appeal Act 1966, s 1 
15 Percival, ‘How to Do Things with Jurisdictions: Wales and the Jurisdiction Question’ (n x) 262 
16 Ibid 
17 For example: Wales Governance Centre, Delivering a Reserved Powers Model of Devolution for Wales (n x) 
Wales Governance Centre, Challenge and Opportunity: The Draft Wales Bill 2015 (February 2016) < 
http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/files/2016/01/Challenge-and-Opportunity-The-Draft-Wales-Bill-2015.pdf> 




minimum, it entails establishing only a distinctively Welsh set of reach rules.18 In other words, 
it instantiates the conceptual definition of jurisdiction without any further institutional reform. 
For others, however, even this conservative option entails more extensive reform. The Welsh 
Government’s conception of ‘distinct’ jurisdiction envisages separate courts, but retains a 
shared judiciary.19 The Wales Governance Centre articulates three different models of ‘distinct’ 
jurisdiction, with those three models capable of further sub-division.20 
The alternative model, ‘separate’ jurisdiction, encompasses various more radical 
options. Under one expansive formulation, a ‘separate’ jurisdiction would entail:  
 
‘[A Welsh] Court of Appeal, High Court, Crown, County and Family Courts, and 
Magistrates Courts. These courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over the law in 
Wales, with the UK Supreme Court as the final court of appeal. The National 
Assembly would have the power to reform, restructure or abolish courts. Judges 
and magistrates would be appointed by or on the advice of the Welsh Ministers, 
and would sit only in Wales. A separate court service for Wales would be funded 
from the Welsh government’s budget and legal aid would also be devolved. Wales 
would have a separate prosecution authority. Wider responsibilities in relation to 
the administration of justice, as regards prisons or offender management for 
example, might also be included. There would be a separate bar and a separate 
solicitors’ profession and no automatic right to practise in Wales if admitted in 
England and vice versa.’21  
 
                                                 
accessed 10 July 2018; Welsh Government, Government and Law in Wales Draft Bill: Explanatory Summary 
(March 2016) < http://www.assembly.wales/ministerial%20statements%20documents/government-laws-wales-
draft-
bill/explanatory%20summary%20for%20government%20laws%20in%20wales%20bill%20english%20website
%20version.pdf> accessed 10 July 2018; Richard Percival, ‘How to Do Things with Jurisdictions: Wales and the 
Jurisdiction Question’ (n x); Rawlings, ‘The Strange Reconstitution of Wales’ (n x),  
18 Percival, ‘How to Do Things with Jurisdictions: Wales and the Jurisdiction Question’ (n x) 
19 Government and Laws in Wales Bill (March 2016) < 
https://gov.wales/docs/cabinetstatements/2016/160307governmentlawsinwalesen1.pdf> accessed 10th July 2018; 
Welsh Government, Government and Law in Wales Draft Bill: Explanatory Summary (n x) 
20 Wales Governance Centre, Challenge and Opportunity: The Draft Wales Bill 2015 (n x) 37-8 
21 ibid 33 




The distinct/separate binary is ambiguous and oversimplified. It fails clearly to 
articulate the sheer range of possible reform. The discussion incorporates several 
distinguishable institutional reforms.22 These include the establishment of: 
 
1. Separate Bodies of Law (i.e. Reach Rules) 
2. Separate Courts 
3. Separate Judiciaries 
4. Separate Legal Professions 
5. Devolved Political Powers over Court Infrastructure and Funding 
6. Devolved Political Powers over the Wider Justice System  
 
We must acknowledge the wide spectrum of possible reforms, encompassing various degrees 
of separation in relation to various different institutions. I shall focus on the reforms 
encompassed by points 1-3: the separation of the Law of Wales from the Law of England, the 
separation of the Courts of Wales from the Courts of England, and the separation of the 
Judiciary of Wales from the Judiciary of England.  
2 Why Now? 
Since the sixteenth century, England and Wales have shared a unified legal jurisdiction.23 
Insofar as the law applying in England and the law applying in Wales is identical or near-
identical, that arrangement is perfectly sensible. To have separate legal systems applying 
essentially the same law would be wasteful and risks confusing divergence. These arguments 
in support of the unified jurisdiction are negative: they endorse the unified jurisdiction based 
on perceived harms of separation. Negative arguments do not identify anything innately 
valuable in the unified system. Nor are positive arguments for the unified jurisdiction readily 
                                                 
22 Even these categories contain elisions. We might separate some but not all courts. Administration of justice 
includes responsibility for police, prisons, prosecution, probation, legal aid, and more. Power could be devolved 
over virtually any combination of these subjects. 
23 Laws in Wales Act 1535; Laws in Wales Act 1542 




available.24 Scotland and Northern Ireland exist as separate legal jurisdictions from England & 
Wales with little discontent about opportunities lost.25 
The proposal to establish a Welsh legal jurisdiction arises principally because the law 
applying in England and the law applying in Wales is no longer near-identical. The law of 
England & Wales incorporates law that applies in both England and Wales, law that applies 
only in Wales, and law that applies only in England. Law limited in territorial scope pre-exists 
devolution, but the volume of such law has swelled since the first, tentative devolution under 
the Government of Wales Act 1998. Devolution to Wales has rapidly expanded from its 
humble, ‘executive’ beginnings.26 Dissatisfaction with that approach led to the spartan 
conferred legislative powers model of the Government Wales Act 2006. Increasingly broad 
powers have been conferred since.27 Most recently, the Wales Act 2017 shifts the model of 
devolution to a reserved powers model and grants additional legislative powers to the Welsh 
Assembly. For some, the latest advances are tarnished by diminution of the Assembly’s power 
in other areas.28 But in any event, a Welsh institution now exercises broad legislative powers. 
At the same time, the UK Parliament increasingly legislates for England alone.29 Even if the 
jurisdiction debate is not new - for Jones and Williams, a Welsh jurisdiction was ‘emerging 
from the unified legal system of England and Wales’30 as long ago as 2004  - the nature and 
urgency of the debate has shifted.  
As the law applying in Wales and the law applying in England diverge, the negative 
reasons for sustaining the unified jurisdiction diminish in persuasiveness. First, the unified 
jurisdiction prevents confusion only insofar as the law applying in England and in Wales is 
near-identical. But the ship of legal uniformity has sailed with the fleet of devolved political 
powers. Indeed, if potential divergence and confusion is a good argument against anything, it 
is a good argument against devolving political power. How many Welsh nationals have been 
                                                 
24 Wales Governance Centre, Delivering a Reserved Powers Model of Devolution for Wales (September 2015) 
<http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/files/2015/09/Devolution-Report-ENG-V4.pdf> accessed 10th July 2018>  
25 Wales is not identical to Scotland or Northern Ireland (Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, A Constitutional 
Crossroads: Ways Forward for the United Kingdom (The BIICL 2015) 1). If proximity and population flow 
matter, they are aspects of the negative arguments criticised below.   
26 On frustrations with this terminology, see: Timothy H Jones and Jane M Williams, ‘Wales as a Jurisdiction’ 
[2004] Public Law 78-101  
27 The greatest gains followed a referendum in 2011:  Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully, Wales Says Yes: 
Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum (University of Wales Press 2012) 
28 Rawlings, ‘The Strange Reconstitution of Wales’ (n x) 74 
29 The advent of EVEL reflects concerns about the legitimacy of all MPs legislating for England alone. See: 
‘English votes for English laws: House of Commons bill procedure’ (Parliament.uk, 22 October 2015) 
<https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/bills/public/english-votes-for-english-laws/> accessed 27 July 
2018. 
30 Jones and Williams, ‘Wales as a Jurisdiction’ (n x) 100 




caught without the cash to pay for their prescription in Bristol? How many Londoners (prior to 
policy alignment in 2015) were visibly shaken at the prospect of paying 5p for a plastic carrier 
bag at Tesco in Newport? Presumably these and other inconveniences are outweighed by 
countervailing considerations. A Welsh legal jurisdiction may increase scope for divergence, 
but it would scarcely be more extensive than that already permitted.  
Second, as English law and Welsh law become more different, establishing separate 
bodies of law and even separate court systems is less frivolous or wasteful. Judicial and 
professional specialisation will be required to cope with diverging statute books, whether or 
not the jurisdictions are formally separated. As the reasons to preserve the status quo exert less 
influence, a Welsh legal jurisdiction becomes an increasingly realistic possibility. Yet 
significant constitutional reform demands justification, and such justification must do more 
than point to a lack of good reasons on the other side of the debate. There may no longer be 
compelling answers to the question ‘why not?’ But the question ‘why?’ remains to be 
answered.    
3 Is Jurisdictional Reform Required by Devolution of Political 
Power? 
In debates over devolution of political power, pragmatic justifications based on efficiency and 
practicality dominate. Unsurprisingly, arguments in favour of a Welsh legal jurisdiction have 
principally focused on perceived practical advantages. For some, the principal justification is 
that jurisdictional reform is necessitated by the devolution of political power to Wales. The 
argument comes in two varieties. First, some have argued that current devolution to Wales 
could create sufficient practical difficulties to justify the establishment of a separate legal 
jurisdiction.31 However, such practical difficulties have not materialised widely, if at all.  
The second version asserts that the lack of a Welsh jurisdiction precludes otherwise 
justified devolution of political power. Many political powers are reserved to Westminster 
institutions specifically in order to preserve the unified jurisdiction. In 2016, the Welsh 
Government said the following about the Bill that would become the Wales Act 2017:  
 
                                                 
31 Wales Governance Centre, Delivering a Reserved Powers Model of Devolution for Wales (n x) 26-7 




‘the UK Government sought to justify the imposition of new, significant and 
impractical constraints on the Assembly’s legislative competence by reference to 
the need to protect this [unified] jurisdiction’ 32 
  
The result, the Welsh Government notes elsewhere, is ‘a confusing and very limited system of 
devolved government.’33 It concludes that ‘the essential requirement not to constrain the Welsh 
legislature in this way, makes the creation of a distinct Welsh jurisdiction essential.’34 Although 
the constraints are less extensive in the Act than the Bill, there are nevertheless substantial 
restrictions on what the Assembly may do in relation to the justice system.  Schedule 1 to the 
Wales Act 2017, inserting a new Schedule 7A into the Government of Wales Act 2006, lists 
the ‘Single legal jurisdiction of England and Wales’ as a ‘General Reservation’.35 Preservation 
of the unified jurisdiction entails  specific reservation of ‘courts’,36 ‘judges’,37  ‘civil or criminal 
proceedings’,38 ‘Tribunals’39 (except wholly Welsh tribunals), ‘private law’ including the law 
of ‘contract, agency, bailment, tort, unjust enrichment and restitution, property, trusts and 
succession’,40 core components of ‘criminal law’,41 and ‘Prisons and Offender Management’.42 
Asserting preservation of the unified jurisdiction as an absolute constraint on devolution 
arguably hinders a principled allocation of power.  
This argument is limited in two ways. The first limitation results from the contentious 
political debate over devolving these powers. The appropriate extent of devolution is a matter 
on which people may adopt different, yet perfectly reasonable views. The argument – that a 
Welsh legal jurisdiction should be established, because its absence limits devolution – will 
persuade only those who believe further devolution is justified. An opponent to devolving 
control of, say, private law, may highlight potential complexity and economic inefficiency, 
considering frequent cross-border trade. This opponent will not accept the Welsh government’s 
argument, since they deny its premise. If it is not an ‘essential requirement’ to devolve further 
political power, this justification for a new legal jurisdiction collapses. We could go further: 
                                                 
32 Welsh Government, Government and Law in Wales Draft Bill: Explanatory Summary (n x) 19 
33 Welsh Government, ‘Coherent, stable and long-lasting devolution for Wales’ (2015) < 
https://gov.wales/docs/caecd/publications/160526-wales-bill-explanatory-en.odp> accessed 10th July 2018 
34 Welsh Government, Government and Law in Wales Draft Bill: Explanatory Summary (n x) 19 
35 Wales Act 2017, Schedule 1 Para 8. 
36 ibid Para 8(1)(a) 
37 ibid Para 8(1)(b) 
38 ibid Para 8(1)(c) 
39 ibid Para 9(1) 
40 ibid Schedule 2 Para 3(2) 
41 ibid Para 4 
42 ibid Schedule 1 Para 175 




arguably, major constitutional change should be avoided if its sole foundations are deeply 
controversial.  
 The second limitation pertains to the argument’s ramifications. Some treat this 
argument a putative justification for far-reaching reform.43 Assuming arguendo that its premise 
is correct, the argument would justify minimal reform, specifically establishing separate bodies 
of law for England and Wales. As the law in England and in Wales diverges, complexity 
increases. When law-making power is devolved, the possibility arises of two different legal 
standards applying to the same thing, yet co-existing within the unified body of law of England 
and Wales. It would be for citizens, lawyers, and courts to disentangle each law’s application. 
Separating the two bodies of law reduces this complexity by clearly delineating the law 
applicable to each territory. 
Might it be argued, by extension, that future divergence necessitates separate courts and 
judiciaries, just as it necessitates separate bodies of law? On this view, separating bodies of law 
does not eradicate complexity; it merely changes the type of complexity. Courts no longer 
disentangle the law, but would instead struggle with large volumes of radically different 
substantive law. Divergence thus requires judicial specialisation: it may be prudent for judges 
to deal with either English or Welsh law, but not both. But specialisation does not require 
separate courts. Specialisation designed to cope with legal complexity exists within the current 
system. The High Court, for example, divides into the Queen’s Bench, Chancery, and Family 
divisions, with further specialist subdivisions. Judges are assigned in order to specialise. Judges 
and courts also specialise by territory. Circuit judges are allocated to one of seven regions, one 
of which is ‘Wales’. Steps have been taken to regionalise parts of the High Court’s 
jurisdiction.44 There is no reason why further regional specialisation should not be possible if 
substantive legal divergence demands it.45 Offsetting complexity is thus a reason for 
establishing separate bodies of law, but not separate courts or judiciaries. Without 
supplementary justifications, there is no reason to pursue more radical reform.   
What kind of argument might justify the more radical step of separating Welsh and 
English courts and judiciaries? We must distinguish the probable effects of separating bodies 
of law, on the one hand, and separating courts and judiciaries, on the other. Separating bodies 
of law is likely to yield benefits of clarity and certainty, as explained above. As the law of 
                                                 
43 Welsh Government, Government and Law in Wales Draft Bill: Explanatory Summary (n x) 
44 Sarah Nason and Maurice Sunkin, ‘The Regionalisation of Judicial Review: Constitutional Authority, Access 
to Justice and Specialisation of Legal Services in Public Law’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 223-53  
45 Jones and Williams, ‘Wales as a Jurisdiction’ (n x)  




England and of Wales become more different, these benefits increase. And while separating 
bodies of law creates the technical possibility of divergent substantive judicial decision-
making, that consequence is improbable. A separate Welsh body of law could be interpreted 
differently from its English counterpart. In principle, a form of words in Welsh legislation 
could mean one thing, while the same or similar words in English legislation could be acquire 
an altogether different interpretation. But if the judges are members of the same courts, with a 
shared hierarchy and culture, they are unlikely to deviate from uniformity in interpretation.46 
Writing of his experience as a Scottish Law Lord, Lord Hope notes ‘a desire among the other 
[Law Lords] that the law on each side of the border should be the same.’47 If the realistic 
possibility of interpretative divergence is an aspiration, then we have a good reason to separate 
the courts and judiciaries. Doing so would establish separate hierarchies and cultures, and 
consequently fewer pressures to conformity.  
Nothing the above argument makes the case for facilitating interpretative divergence. 
It will not suffice to assert that the courts and judiciaries should be separated, just so that Welsh 
political institutions can be devolved power over them. Proponents of more radical reform need 
additional justifications that identify the value of differently functioning court system or 
differently constituted judiciary. Such justification has not yet been compellingly advanced,48 
but I shall now outline one possible line of argument. 
4 Does the Nature of the Judicial Function Justify Jurisdictional 
Reform?  
In 2015, a group of Welsh lawyers published a pamphlet: ‘Justice for Wales: In support of a 
Welsh Jurisdiction’.49 The group assert: 
   
                                                 
46 Similarly, on why feminist judges do not always make feminist decisions: Rosemary Hunter, ‘More Than Just 
a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-Making’ (2015) 68 Current Legal Problems 119-41, 126-29 
47 Lord Hope, ‘Taking the Case to London - Is It All Over?’ [1998] Juridical Review 135-49, 146 
48 Another argument is that Welsh control over the judiciary would facilitate promotion of the Welsh language in 
the higher courts. There is already good availability of Welsh speaking judges in the lower courts, but not in the 
High Court and above (Gwynedd Parry, ‘Is Breaking up Hard to Do? The Case for a Separate Welsh Jurisdiction’ 
[2017] Irish Jurist 61-93). The argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it is not clear why Welsh speaking 
judges could not be appointed to the higher courts under the current system, as they are in the lower courts. Second, 
one might prefer legal expertise not to be subordinated to language in appointments to the higher courts. Especially 
since the individual citizen typically participates less in these hearings.  
49 Justice for Wales, In support of a Welsh Jurisdiction (2015) 
<http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/files/2015/11/Publisher-version-of-Pamphletfinal.pdf> accessed 31 July 2018 




‘It is important that judges understand the cultural milieu from which cases that 
they hear, and the laws they interpret, arise. The New Zealand judiciary, for 
example, is of high repute, but few would think it acceptable that New Zealand 
judges should routinely decide English cases and interpret English laws.’50 
 
The group are concerned that the unified jurisdiction creates the same potential problems: ‘At 
present, a court sitting in Sheffield or Luton is as competent to determine the meaning of Welsh 
legislation as one sitting in Swansea or Llangefni.’51 For the pamphleteers, there is harm in 
non-Welsh judges adjudicating the law applicable in Wales, and corollary value in establishing 
separate Welsh courts to adjudicate that law. I shall ask whether their assertion is correct. The 
answer to this question matters: if the pamphleteers are right, there is a principled reason to 
separate English and Welsh courts and judiciaries.  
4.1 Judicial Discretion and Community Values 
The question of whether Wales – or anywhere – ought to have its own courts and judiciary 
turns on the nature of judging. The precise judicial function varies between jurisdictions. Some 
judges in some jurisdictions may do things that other judges in other jurisdictions may not. Yet 
there are universal features of the judicial function. Judges everywhere make legally 
authoritative decisions in cases that come before them. In doing so they must identify, interpret, 
and apply the law of their jurisdiction(s). 
 How might the judicial function compel the establishment of a separate Welsh judicial 
and court system? On one view, it will not. If we sketch judges as cartoon formalists, then 
judges just apply established legal rules. On this view, judges take the law of a jurisdiction, 
apply it to established facts, and spit out decisions like bewigged calculators. Deciding English 
cases in New Zealand, or Welsh matters in Sheffield is unproblematic. If a legally competent 
judge understands the relevant rules and procedures, they should be able to competently decide 
any case. In other words, judging is wholly removed from the cultural milieu in which the 
dispute and the applicable law arose. Fortunately for proponents of separate Welsh courts, this 
understanding of judging is unrealistic, existing only (if at all) as an ideal.52 The formalist judge 
requires a perfectly clear and comprehensive legal code, something well beyond the capability 
                                                 
50 ibid 9 
51 ibid 
52 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism’ in Jules Coleman (ed), Hart's Postscript (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 




of any human legislator.53 As Lord Reid famously observed: ‘we must accept the fact that for 
better or for worse judges do make law, and tackle the question how do they approach their 
task and how should they approach it.’54 
 A realistic view of the judicial function recognises that judges do more than just apply 
rules to facts. Prominent theoretical accounts differ on the precise nature of the judicial 
function, but most recognise that judges have recourse to something more than the legal rules 
in their decision-making. Even the most rule-centric accounts of judging admit that rules are 
frequently not determinative. For Hart, judges decide according to valid rules of the legal 
system in most cases, but in ‘every legal system a large and important field is left open for the 
exercise of discretion by courts and other officials’.55 Where uncertainty arises over the 
meaning or application of legal rules, judges must exercise discretion to decide the case before 
them. This discretion is not unlimited, but subject to ‘many constraints narrowing [the judge’s] 
choice’.56 A judge, faced with no clear rule determining the outcome of a case, ought not to 
decide by coin-toss or based on his or her take on the relative physical attractiveness of the 
parties, or any other irrelevant consideration. For Hart’s positivist successors, judges should 
exercise their discretion in accordance with techniques of legal reasoning.57 They proceed by 
analogy and from abstract principle, having recourse to underlying ‘considerations of political 
morality’ in ‘cases in which source-based laws are indeterminate or where they conflict.’58 
Even on this positivist view of the judicial function, judicial decisions are sometimes guided 
by considerations of moral or political principle.  
For these purposes it scarcely matters which theoretical account of the judicial function 
is adopted.59 What matters is that theorists agree on the narrow point that judges decide cases 
based on something more than clear-cut legal rules. And most take (or should take) this 
something more to include what I shall call community values. What are community values? I 
mean the moral and political values that are held, by and large, within a specific community. 
These community values are roughly what Hart labels ‘conventional’60 or ‘positive’61 morality: 
                                                 
53 Hart, The Concept of Law (n x) 126 
54 Lord Reid, ‘The Judge as Law Maker’ (1972) 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 22-29, 22 
55 Hart, The Concept of Law (n x) 136 
56 Ibid 273 (original emphasis omitted) 
57 Ibid 274-75; John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford University Press 2012) 37-42  
58 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 
1995) 223 
59 Hartian positivism is as close to formalism as it gets. Others would only argue that values and principles play 
an even greater role. See, for example: Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Hart Publishing 1998) 
60 Hart, The Concept of Law (n x) 169 
61 H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Stanford University Press 1963) 20 




‘the morality actually accepted and shared by a given social group’.62 Such conventional 
morality is distinguished from critical morality: ‘the general moral principles used in the 
criticism of actual social institutions including positive morality.’63 By way of illustration, in 
Community X a canon of conventional morality holds that better-off citizens should financially 
provide for worse-off citizens. Those who criticise this viewpoint on libertarian grounds 
employ values of critical morality. The former, conventional standards are those prevailing in 
the community right now. The latter are claimed as general standards against which 
conventional standards can be assessed. There are, naturally, connections between the two. For 
Neil MacCormick, ‘If the critical moralist does his work well and persuades his fellows of the 
greater rationality of his view, the effect over time must be a change in [conventional] 
morality.’64  
 One might feel squeamish about judges relying on standards held conventionally, rather 
than objectively true moral standards. Faced with an apparent choice between objectively true 
standards and those which just happen to be held in a given society at a given time, it may 
indeed seem perverse to prefer the latter. Conventional standards, the critic would argue, are 
likely to be mistaken whereas objectively true standards cannot be mistaken.  
 My first response is a reminder that any apparent choice between conventional 
standards and objectively true standards is illusory. If a universally true, ascertainable, and 
readily applicable set of values were available, then it would be preferable for judges to exercise 
their discretion on that basis.65 But a critical morality meeting these criteria is not available, 
even to senior judges. For Jeremy Waldron, ‘there are many of us, and we disagree about 
justice.’66 In circumstances of reasonable disagreement, we cannot be sure which standards are 
objectively true and which are not. In these circumstances, the fairest and most reliable 
heuristic is ordinarily a society’s conventional standards. A broad community consensus is as 
good as it gets. It ought to be noted that, for Waldron, such disagreement entails ‘normative 
positivism’.67 Normative positivism recommends that recourse to moral judgement be 
expunged from judicial decision-making. It therefore seeks to minimalise judicial discretion. 
For the purposes of this paper we can remain agnostic about the merits of normative 
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positivism.68 But three considerations reduce the force of any normative positivist objection to 
my argument. One: irrespective of whether normative positivism is correct, judicial decision-
making inevitably entails discretion and that discretion will frequently be exercised according 
to moral or political principles. Since real cases inevitably require judicial discretion, it is 
important that this discretion is exercised as well as possible. Two: potentially problematic 
features of discretionary judicial decision-making are reduced when judicial decisions are 
subordinate to legislation. Judges are constrained, by both the parameters of existing legislation 
and the possibility of being overridden by future legislation. Three: even if lingering concerns 
remain, it is unlikely an attractive alternative to judicial discretion exists. Since legal disputes 
inevitably arise and at least some of those disputes are incapable of resolution on the basis of 
positive law alone, someone will have to exercise discretion to resolve some legal disputes. It 
is not at all obvious that there exists a better option than the courts.  
A second response to the objection that community values should not be relevant in 
judicial decision-making is to point out that values held conventionally frequently result from 
communities’ ‘peculiar but real needs’.69 In other words, community values differ from place 
to place because of differences between those places. Perhaps Community X, economically and 
nutritionally dependent on fishing, abhors the use of plastic drinking straws because of their 
catastrophic impact on the fish-stock in nearby waters. Perhaps Community Y strongly favours 
state-provided healthcare because its populace is relatively poor and unhealthy. In these 
circumstances, objective moral principles cannot reflect the needs of the community in 
question. Even if objective values are available, they only gain real relevance through a process 
of specification from abstract norms in conjunction with facts about the place and its people. 
The result, either way, is a distinctive set of community values. Purportedly objective abstract 
norms are unlikely to be of great utility to the judge, except insofar as the judge carries out the 
task of specification. If values must be so manipulated, they end up looking a lot like 
conventional morality.  
A third response is to argue that a community has a democratic interest in being 
governed according to its own values.70 Democratic political institutions like legislatures 
obviously reflect this interest. Less obviously, but nevertheless importantly, judicial 
institutions are capable of reflecting that interest. There may be limits to the scope of this 
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democratic interest. Perhaps a community holds the collective view that marital rape is fine, or 
interracial marriage wrong. In such cases, judicial reinforcement of community values through 
their decisions would be deeply concerning. A question thus arises: at what point might we 
want judges to disregard conventional values in favour of critical values? The question can 
sidestepped, for now, since it does not detract from the idea that it is usually appropriate for 
judges to exercise discretion in a way that upholds and reinforces relevant community values.  
If I am right that judges do and should decide some cases by reference to community 
values, then judicial legitimacy is determined, in part, by judges’ ability to adequately identify 
and apply the community values of the relevant legal system. For Joseph Raz, the legitimacy 
of law’s authority derives from its capacity to serve those it purports to govern.71 All of us are 
subject to reasons that determine how we should act. In deciding how to act, we weigh these 
reasons to choose our best available option. Law purports to pre-empt this weighing exercise. 
Law tells its subjects to ignore the usual reasons and just to follow the legal rule instead. The 
law establishing speed limits on roads, for example, takes the reasons that ordinarily apply to 
individuals (e.g. the importance of bodily integrity, the social harm of providing care to those 
with serious injury, the road’s proximity to pavements or schools, the science of human 
reaction times, and so on) and converts them into an authoritative, pre-emptive rule: don’t drive 
above a particular speed on a particular stretch of road. For Raz, an authority is legitimate if its 
subjects will more likely comply with the reasons that ordinarily apply to them if they follow 
the authority’s directives, instead of deciding how to act for themselves.72 In other words, 
authorities are legitimate if they do a better job of guiding their subjects than the subjects 
themselves could do. Courts, as one institution within a legal system, make claims to authority. 
Their judgments purport to pre-empt the reasons that ordinarily would apply to their subjects. 
That being so, courts are legitimate if their decisions reliably guide subjects to comply with the 
reasons that would ordinarily apply to them.  
How does Raz’s theory of authority relate to the jurisdiction debate? Relevant 
considerations in hard cases include reasons deriving from community values. For example, 
the unusually high value Community X places on the quality of its fishing waters should 
influence the interpretation of an unclear piece of Environmental legislation passed by that 
community’s legislature. Courts are legitimate (they will ordinarily do a better job of guiding 
their subjects than the subjects could guide themselves) only if they understand the reasons 
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deriving from community values that apply to their subjects. It is unlikely that a New Zealand 
court, in a hard English case, would have the requisite understanding to exercise its discretion 
in a way that guides subjects of English law better than those subjects could guide themselves. 
If legitimacy is constituted by the ability to reliably convert relevant reasons into directives, 
then knowledge and understanding of the relevant reasons is preconditional.  
This theoretical idea finds support in judicial practice. The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) inevitably judges the human rights-compatibility of domestic law with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Under the analysis above, ECtHR’s function 
risks illegitimacy. In hard cases, where the compatibility of domestic law and ECHR rights is 
not clear-cut, ECtHR has discretion. It may choose between rival outcomes, based on 
underlying principle, including community values. In these circumstances, judgment by 
ECtHR appears less legitimate than judgment by domestic courts. ECtHR is less likely to guide 
domestic actors to comply with the reasons that apply to them. Of course, ECtHR recognises 
this danger. When its ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine is invoked, ECtHR refrains from 
concretely deciding. Instead, it defers to domestic authorities, including courts. In the landmark 
Handyside73 case, ECtHR rationalised the doctrine: 
 
‘it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a 
uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws 
of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, 
especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution 
of opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with 
the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better 
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
requirements’74 
 
For ECtHR, values differ between places and times. It follows that local courts, embedded in 
a community and its values, are better placed to answer difficult legal questions.75  
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4.2 Application to Wales 
Judges inevitably decide cases by reference to community values as well as the posited rules 
of a jurisdiction. It follows that judges’ understanding of the relevant community values matters 
for their legitimacy, just as their legal expertise matters. The intuitive objection to a court based 
in New Zealand deciding an English case is explained by their lack of understanding of local 
values. As conventional wisdom would have it, to understand a place one must become 
embedded within it. This lack of understanding may not preclude the New Zealand judges from 
identifying and applying English legal rules, but it will prevent them from reliably drawing on 
relevant community values in deciding how to interpret these rules. The likelihood that hard 
cases will not be appropriately decided constitutes a compelling reason to demand that judges 
deciding cases for a place are sufficiently embedded in that place.  
  It follows that if Welsh community values differ sufficiently from English community 
values, then Welsh legal disputes should be resolved in Welsh courts by judges cognisant of 
Welsh community values. The obvious question is: do Welsh community values differ 
sufficiently from English community values? Divergence in community values is not binary, 
nor is it obviously quantifiable. It is a matter of judgement, and one that I am ill-equipped to 
make. I will suggest three relevant considerations.  
First, it would be mistaken to summarily dismiss this argument on the basis of a shared 
recent history. Membership of the United Kingdom does not rule out the existence of 
differences in community values capable of affecting the legitimacy of legal adjudication. Nor 
does historic membership of the unified jurisdiction.76  
Second, in principle it is less harmful to separate the court and judicial systems too 
hastily than too tardily. Where, within an existing legal system, there is some divergence 
between one territory and another, but not enough to justify separation, little harm is caused by 
premature separation. Judicial decisions may remain similar between the two jurisdictions, and 
there may be some unnecessary disruption. But if divergence is sufficient to justify separation, 
failure to separate causes substantial harm. In these circumstances, a community is subject to 
law that does not fully reflect its values. To that extent, the law is illegitimate. All else being 
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equal, a mere possibility of difference in community values justifies separate courts and 
judiciaries.77  
Third, there is reason to believe the community values of Wales differ from England. 
The very fact of devolution of political power may reflect differences in community values. 
Devolution permits a community to be governed in accordance with its own values.78 
Observably, devolution has permitted policy divergence between Wales and England. Welsh 
institutions have been pro-active on the environment, in respect of children’s rights, education, 
healthcare, and many more public policy areas. Such reforms presumptively reflect distinctive 
Welsh community values. Increasingly, the Welsh arms of UK-wide political parties exist as 
distinct entities, promoting an agenda constituted from within the specific culture and politics 
of Wales. As with Scotland, Wales has a prominent political party that is uniquely Welsh.  
Moreover, the view that Welsh community values are distinctive has received high-level 
judicial endorsement in the Asbestos Diseases79 case. For Lord Thomas, legislation imposing 
healthcare costs on negligent employers: 
 
‘can […] be seen as reflecting choices of social and economic policy and of social 
justice in Wales which may be different to the views of social and economic policy 
and social justice reasonably held in other parts of the United Kingdom’.80 
 
In other words, the policy in the disputed legislation reflected distinctive Welsh community 
values. The Asbestos Diseases case decided the Welsh Assembly’s competence to enact the 
Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill. The Bill sought to recover the 
costs of NHS healthcare for sufferers of asbestos-related diseases from their former employers 
and the employers’ insurers. These employers are liable in tort, but free at point of use 
healthcare means that cost of healthcare is not a recoverable loss. The UK Supreme Court 
(UKSC) unanimously held that the Bill exceeded the Assembly’s competence, but divided 3-2 
between more and less restrictive approaches. For Lord Mance, with whom Lords Neuberger 
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and Hodge agreed, the recovery mechanism exceeded the powers conferred to the Welsh 
Assembly under the Government of Wales Act 2006.81 It was, moreover, in contravention of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR (A1P1), both in respect of its effects on employers and 
their insurers. For Lord Thomas, with whom Lady Hale agreed, the aims and machinery of the 
Bill were, in principle, within the Assembly’s powers. Nor were the A1P1 rights of employers 
violated. For the minority, the Bill was nevertheless ultra vires, for disproportionately 
interfering with the A1P1 rights of the insurers. Lord Thomas, the then Lord Chief Justice, was 
empanelled for his understanding of the Welsh context.82  
Not only does Lord Thomas endorse the notion that Welsh and English community 
values differ, the differences between the minority and majority judgments are striking. Lord 
Thomas repeatedly characterises NHS healthcare of sufferers of asbestos-related diseases as a 
‘state benefit provided by the State to such employers and their insurers which relieves them 
of some of the consequences of the employers’ wrongdoing as tortfeasor.’83 This construal of 
the status quo as a state benefit to corporations contrasts with Lord Mance’s focus on 
corporations’ private law rights and liabilities. It is tempting to characterise Lord Thomas as 
the Welsh socialist foil to Lord Mance’s English centre-right approach. Arguably, the 
differences in rhetoric reflect distinct philosophies of the relationship between the state, its 
citizens, and commercial interests. If so, the difference in judicial perspective maps onto the 
broad-brush difference in community values between Wales and England. After all, Wales 
consistently returns large majorities of Labour MPs and AMs to the Westminster Parliament84 
and Welsh Assembly,85 contrasting with England’s generally Conservative inclination.86  
This difference in approach influences the contrasting judgments on the issue of 
whether the Bill is beyond the Welsh Assembly’s competence. For Lord Mance, the conferred 
power the Welsh Assembly purported to act under – ‘organisation and funding of national 
health service’ – could not […] have been conceived with a view to covering what would 
amount in reality to rewriting the law of tort and breach of statutory duty’.87 Lord Thomas does 
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not regard the Bill as rewriting the law of tort, but as removing a subsidy by imposing a charge 
for NHS services, akin to a prescription charge. It follows that: 
 
‘In principle […] the Welsh Assembly has competence to enact legislation for 
charging for services by way of the treatment and long term care of those with 
asbestos-related diseases provided the moneys so raised are used exclusively for 
the Welsh NHS.’88  
 
The primary legislative aim – charging for services – therefore falls within competence for 
Lord Thomas. It is a charge for services, moreover, that employers of patients would be liable 
to pay were it not for the ‘state benefit’ the NHS confers on them. For that reason, there is no 
reason to deny the Assembly’s competence. Indeed, the legislation implements the most 
efficient mechanism for securing its primary aim.89   
Another difference in judicial approach concerns the proportionality of the Bill with 
A1P1 property rights. The measure amounts to a retrospective imposition of financial liability, 
and therefore engages the A1P1 rights of employers and their insurers. The UKSC held 
unanimously that the insurers’ rights were violated by the Bill, since the Bill overrode elements 
of insurance contracts limiting insurers’ financial exposure. But the UKSC divided on the 
proportionality of the interference with the employers’ rights. For Lord Mance, the ‘special 
justification’ required to establish the proportionality of retrospective liability is not 
established.90 Lord Thomas reaches the opposite conclusion. Of critical importance is his 
emphasis on the importance of ‘the social and economic context of Wales’.91 He refers 
specifically to the historic prevalence of heavy industry in Wales, the concomitant prevalence 
of asbestos-related disease, and the resulting financial burden on the NHS in Wales.92 As a 
result ‘It has long been seen as a matter of social justice that proper compensation and care be 
provided at the expense of employers […] to those suffering from such diseases’.93 In other 
words, as a result of its history and context, Wales has taken a particular view on this issue of 
social justice. Lord Thomas' understanding of the context and the aims of the Welsh Assembly 
influence his determination of the proportionality question. Lord Thomas ‘would accord great 
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weight to the Welsh Assembly’s judgement, not simply weight as Lord Mance states’.94 And 
for Lord Thomas: 
 
‘the special justification […] has been established, given the social and economic 
policy in dealing with the present consequences of past wrongdoing by employers 
by discontinuing a benefit to the wrongdoer.’95  
 
The harm to employers’ A1P1 rights is therefore in proportion to the public interest; a fair 
balance is struck.96 The difference in approach apparently results from the view of the 
importance of the public interest at stake. For Lord Thomas, interference with property rights 
is justified by the social harms that interference avoids. For Lord Mance, the public interest is 
insufficiently weighty. Critically, the difference appears to result from Lord Thomas’ relative 
sensitivity to the Welsh context and its unique sense of social justice. In other words: its 
community values.  
The judge empanelled for his understanding of the Welsh context thus reaches 
conclusions more sympathetic to Welsh policy. It is admittedly speculative to explain this 
difference by reference to understandings of local community values. But it is a speculation in 
which I am prepared to indulge, for this reason: even if the difference in approach in this case 
did not in fact reflect different community values, judicial approaches plausibly could differ on 
that basis. Differences in outlook can lead to differences in legal reasoning. Where the law 
ought to reflect one outlook and not another, it is problematic when an institution is structured 
to favour the less appropriate option.  
4.3 Is the Legitimacy of the UKSC Undermined? 
Even the most radical proposals for reform preserve the UKSC as the apex court of a Welsh 
jurisdiction. The UKSC presently fulfils this function for all UK jurisdictions, excepting Scots 
criminal law. Might the argument from the judicial function imperil the legitimacy of this 
appellate jurisdiction? The judiciary of the UKSC is appointed predominantly from English 
legal practice, with minority representation from Scotland and Northern Ireland. The UKSC 
judiciary is not, therefore, fully embedded in the communities of the devolved nations. It may 
follow that the UKSC is ill-suited to deciding hard cases arising from devolved nations, whose 
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community values are distinct from England’s. If so, the present argument might undermine 
the UKSC’s authority, not only over a future Welsh jurisdiction, but over the already separate 
Scottish and Northern Irish jurisdictions.  
The UKSC appointments process recognises these risks. The Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005, s. 27(8) stipulates that commissions for selecting UKSC judges ‘must ensure that 
between them the judges will have knowledge of, and experience of practice in, the law of each 
part of the United Kingdom.’ In practice, commissions ensure that the UKSC judiciary 
represents Scotland, Northern Ireland, and England & Wales.97 Although there is no practice 
of appointing a Welsh judge,98 for cases concerning Welsh law the UKSC has empanelled non-
UKSC judges with an understanding of the Welsh law and context.99 It is probable that if 
separate Welsh courts were established, the practice of appointing a representative judge to the 
UKSC would extend to Wales. 
Judges from the devolved nations may offset the potential drawbacks of devolved law 
being decided in the UKSC. Indeed, my argument may help justify the existing practice. 
However, while UKSC appointments practice undoubtedly offsets this potential blot on the 
court’s authority, it does not eradicate it. Judges representing the relevant devolved nation 
never outnumber those from England. Conceivably, non-local judges, drawing on their own 
understanding of the relevant community values, can reject the local judge’s understanding of 
local community values. Arguably, the Asbestos Diseases case illustrates this danger. 
Consequently, the authority of the UKSC may still be disputed. 
 If I am right, must the jurisdiction of the UKSC be drastically narrowed and final courts 
of appeal established for each UK jurisdiction? Not necessarily. The role of the UKSC is 
grounded in the expertise of its judges. Such expertise is a valuable resource on which all 
devolved legal systems may want to draw. Could we retain recourse to this expertise while 
reducing the risk of overreach? One option would be to drastically increase the size of the 
UKSC bench to enable greater representation of the devolved nations. Alternatively, the UKSC 
has doctrinal tools at its disposal to ensure that it does not overstep the bounds of its legitimacy. 
Just as it might defer to a political institution on political questions, the UKSC could adopt a 
doctrine of deference to the courts of each of the devolved jurisdictions. Admittedly, deference 
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of this sort is typically granted to political institutions. But courts do also recognise the limits 
of their institutional competence vis a vis other courts. Appellate courts do not typically re-
determine facts, but are limited to resolving points of law. These practices respond to appellate 
courts’ limitations as fact-finders. If the argument from the judicial function is correct, UK-
wide appellate courts ought also to recognise their limitations as deciders of hard cases from 
devolved jurisdictions. The UKSC might therefore adopt a deferential attitude to a hypothetical 
Welsh Court of Appeal. An obvious drawback is that this suggestion guts the UKSC of its 
central role. If an appellate court does not have legitimate authority to determine questions of 
law in hard cases, it is hard to conceive what useful function it serves.  
If the authority of the UKSC in the devolved jurisdictions is undermined, that does not 
necessarily undermine my argument. Political institutions in the devolved nations have 
changed radically since the mid-1990s. There is no reason to think legal institutions are immune 
to the same pressures that necessitate political reform. Nor is the notion of limiting the UKSC’s 
jurisdiction over UK jurisdictions without precedent: Scots criminal cases cannot usually be 
appealed to the UKSC. The continuing jurisdiction of the UKSC ought not, then, be considered 
a red line. 
5 Conclusion 
I have sought to understand the force and scope of justifications for jurisdictional reform in 
Wales. In doing do, I have proposed a general account of the legitimacy of court and judicial 
systems. Legitimacy frequently depends on judges’ ability to exercise their law-making 
function in line with the values adopted by the community they adjudicate for. Where judges 
predominantly from one community adjudicate for another community with a distinctive set of 
values, the law risks failing to reflect the community it purports to govern. Whether legislated 
or judge-made, law failing to serve those it governs lacks legitimacy. There are differences in 
community values between Wales and England. The question remains whether there is 
sufficient difference to imperil the legitimacy of the unified court and judicial system. But there 
is certainly a question to answer and I have outlined the framework for doing so. 
